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Knowing is Half the Battle? 
Reflections on Myth, Metaphor, 
and the Untranslatability of Pain 
 
Eugenia Tsao 
 
 
And the serpent  
Slipping between her gown and her smooth breasts 
Went writhing on, though imperceptible 
To the fevered woman’s touch or sight, and breathed 
Viper’s breath into her. The sinuous mass 
Became her collar of twisted gold, became 
The riband of her headdress. In her hair 
It twined itself, and slid around her body. 
While the infection first, like dew of poison 
Fallen on her, pervaded all her senses, 
Netting her bones in fire. 
(Virgil, Book VII: 480-490) 
 
 Several years ago, I found myself 
sitting by a window in a Toronto café, 
watching pedestrians flow by on a cool, 
rainy evening. I was working on a project 
about the cultural etiologies of eating 
disorders, and one of my chief arguments 
was that mainstream psychiatry’s infatuation 
with biomolecular and neurochemical 
explanations for the disorder (which, at that 
time, were receiving considerable attention 
in the news media) served to conceal its 
intensely social and political dimensions. 
That night, the informant whom I was 
interviewing spent most of our chat stirring 
her tea thoughtfully, trying to find the words 
with which to describe the churning, 
trancelike pain of a bulimic episode. Visibly 
frustrated, Julia1 found that she could 
portray the felt experience of binging and 
purging only in negations: it was not quite 
hypnotic, not quite ecstatic; exhausting but 
exhilarating; exhilarating but abominable, 
“and there is always fear, always,” and 
ultimately it was none of these things at all. 
The language of predicate statements simply 
failed when called upon to communicate 
what it was to experience what she 
experienced. The contributions of the 
vaunted clinical handbook, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders — 
“a dissociative quality”? “impaired control”? 
— were even less satisfying (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000:590).  
As servers cleared the tables around 
us and began to upturn chairs in preparation 
for the café’s closure, Julia leaned in, 
clucked her tongue, and posed a question of 
her own. Had I ever studied Classical 
literature? In response to my affirmative 
reply, she suggested that I reread the Roman 
scribe Virgil’s epic poem The Aeneid and 
take the time to note the frequency with 
which the actions of its protagonists are said 
to be motivated by ruin, or folly, which slips 
organically into acts of hubris that provoke 
the gods and elicit divine retaliation. As 
Julia pointed out, the Hesperian queen 
Amata, whose inhabitation by the fury 
Allecto is described in the above epigraph, is 
never possessed per se — it is made clear 
throughout the poem that Amata is acting on 
her own initiative and that she is the author 
of her own downfall. Yet her decisions are 
invariably motivated by a concern for her 
people’s best interests and, as a pawn in a 
cosmological drama with a predetermined 
outcome, the queen invites considerable 
sympathy. While she hangs herself in the 
final verses, unable to bear the sight of her 
burning city, audiences are enjoined to 
discern in her “sad frenzy” a kernel of hope 
(Virgil, Book XII:819), for hers is a unique 
kind of defeat: her city is not destroyed, but 
rebuilt and transformed into the seat of an 
infant Roman republic. Amata’s story, Julia 
explained, was a subtle parable about the 
inter-dependence of pain, hope, risk, and 
fate that she saw as an irreducible feature of 
her condition. With a wry smirk, she noted 
that clinicians nonetheless viewed her 
tortuous identification with the Hesperian 
queen as a sort of delusion, a symptom of 
recalcitrant psychopathology that had to be 
dislodged. To her, existential pain was a 
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cardinal ingredient of life that she digested 
with the aid of rich allegories and 
mythologies; to her physicians, it was 
something that signalled irrationality and 
demanded banishment. 
Anthropologists have long noted that 
a major casualty of biomedicine’s cultural 
prestige has been respect for patients’ 
firsthand experiences, which are routinely 
trivialized as idiosyncratic and “used in a 
condescending way by the expert as the raw 
material upon which to base diagnoses, 
generalizations, and theories” (Gabriel 
2004:176). Firsthand experiences of pain, in 
particular, occupy a fraught place in the 
Western medical lexicon: inaccessible to 
third-party authorities, pain nonetheless 
plays a central role in diagnostic and 
prognostic reasoning and situates sufferers 
in the untenable space of being both an 
expert and an object of expertise. 
Oncologists, anaesthesiologists, and 
psychiatrists alike draw elaborate 
conclusions from their patients’ descriptions 
of pain, and yet physicians regularly 
concede that the metrics they employ are not 
only quantitatively imprecise but 
qualitatively inadequate (Fishman 2009; 
Morris 1993; Pernick 1985).  To study pain 
is to live vicariously, always guessing and 
never quite knowing if our own twinges, 
aches, longings, and pangs, and the rubrics 
through which we relate to them, can ever 
be mapped onto others’. 
What is the epistemological 
significance of Julia’s frustrations with her 
psychiatrists and ultimately with adjectival 
language itself? What contributions can 
anthropologists make to the enterprise of 
understanding the ontological value of pain 
to patients themselves, especially in 
instances when they are resistant to its 
medicalization? How might ethnographic 
studies of affect inform clinical and 
bioethical ones? In this paper, I strive to 
shed light on these questions by comparing 
three distinct analytic frameworks con-
cerning the subjective embodiment and 
intersubjective interpretation of pain: Robert 
Desjarlais’ 1997 ethnography of mental 
illness and homelessness in Boston, Jean 
Jackson’s 2003 essay on inpatients at a New 
England chronic pain hospice, and Gananath 
Obeyesekere’s classic 1981 study of social 
stigma and spirit possession in eastern Sri 
Lanka. Each author makes a valuable 
contribution to a debate that has run the 
gauntlet of Western medicine for two 
centuries: to what extent is the pain of an 
individual person knowable by, and 
disclosable to, others? As I hope to reveal, 
while each approach has its deficits, a close 
reading of their overlapping insights brings 
into sharp relief the key role of metaphoric 
and idiomatic tools in making pain legible, 
and suggests that those who study pain too 
closely sometimes only contribute to its 
intensification. 
Before proceeding further, three 
caveats must be established. Firstly, pain is 
conceptualized in the following pages not as 
physiological nociception — that is, the 
autonomic delivery of chemical impulses to 
the central nervous system that follows the 
reception of a material stimulus — but as a 
phenomenological experience. As Saris 
(1995:57-58) reminds us, pain is not a thing; 
it is an affective concept that we impose 
upon convergences of observations about 
ourselves, and cannot be quantified directly. 
Secondly, even in cultural contexts wherein 
the Cartesian preoccupation with mind/body 
distinctions is everywhere encoded, the body 
remains “the existential ground of culture,” 
no more extricable from our experience of 
sentience and selfhood than our sensorial 
organs or perceptual faculties (Csordas 
1990:5). Thirdly and consequently, “if 
emotionally caused pain is experienced 
physically, it is physical pain, no ifs, ands, 
or buts” (Jackson 2003:173). 
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The medium is the message 
If emotional pain is physical pain, 
then why is communicating it so notoriously 
difficult? When attempting to recruit others’ 
understanding, what techniques do people 
employ to translate their embodied pain 
experiences into verbal or nonverbal cues, 
and from what forms of reasoning do these 
techniques emerge? In his acclaimed 
ethnography Shelter Blues: Sanity and 
Selfhood among the Homeless, Robert 
Desjarlais (1997) suggests that in a culture 
like ours — which privileges the empirical 
and verifiable above all else — efforts to 
communicate pain are unusually susceptible 
to suspicion, disbelief, and trivialization. 
Those efforts, nonetheless, may be shaped 
by the very same forms of empirical logic 
that facilitate their trivialization.  
As Desjarlais reveals (1997), due to 
a high rate of schizophrenia in the shelter 
population, staff members at the Boston’s 
Station Street Shelter “found themselves 
working with a population that, they 
believed, often had to be brought back into 
the fold of the real” (192-193), and they 
laboured to explain to shelter residents that 
their claims of distress had to be based in 
forms of factually verifiable evidence or else 
they would be suspected of faking it. 
Rehabilitative programs for residents 
accordingly made use of an elaborate system 
of rewards and punishments designed to 
socialize residents into the communicative 
values of “lucidity, validity, accuracy, 
authenticity, and transparency of meaning” 
(Desjarlais 1997:194). Shelter personnel 
responded to residents’ complaints of sundry 
aches, pains, and emotional hurts by 
evaluating their referential worth. Did the 
social workers’ documentary records 
confirm a history of psychological distress, 
for example, or perhaps a pre-existing 
medical condition? Residents who wished to 
overcome the skepticisms of staff members 
had to ground their assertions in some form 
of substantive evidence and would 
commonly direct staff to doctors’ written 
testimonies. This system brought about a 
population of residents who were constantly 
preoccupied with innovating new ways to 
demonstrate to shelter personnel the 
authenticity and intensity of their distress. In 
some cases, residents sought to substantiate 
their pain by resorting to self-injurious 
practices (sometimes colloquially known as 
“cutting”), although this was routinely 
interpreted by shelter personnel as further 
evidence of psychopathology. 
Desjarlais reframes the conflict 
between residents’ and staff members’ 
logics as a conflict between the empiricist 
infatuation with ontological-referential truth 
and the existentialist conception of truth as a 
personal construction. Some shelter 
residents responded to the empiricist 
imperative by playing up their physical 
ailments and downplaying their emotional 
ones: in contrast to feelings of misery or 
anxiety, which carried the risk of being 
deemed ‘merely’ psychological and possibly 
imagined or embellished, “toothaches and 
pinched nerves could carry an indisputable, 
self-felt presence that was usually hard to 
deny” (Desjarlais 1997:231-232). Many 
others, however, turned to self-injury as a 
vehicle for making undeniable the veracity 
of their dissatisfaction with society, the 
cards they’d been dealt in life, and the 
homeless shelter. By making “lasting, 
readable incisions” on their forearms 
(Desjarlais 1997:234), residents inserted 
themselves into a universe of meaning 
bound up in historically intelligible, if not 
always sanctioned, practices — tattoos, 
body piercings, slit wrists, scarification, 
Christ-like lacerations — and strove to 
inscribe irrefutable insignias of their pain 
into the most evidential canvas at their 
disposal: their bodies (see also Aretxaga 
1995). In such instances, the ‘proof of pain’ 
that shelter personnel sought lay not only in 
TOTEM vol 19 2010-2011 
 
 
Tsao: Knowing is Half the Battle?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
TOTEM 41 
 
the mere presence of wounds and scars on 
residents’ bodies, but in the very fact that 
these residents felt an urgent need to make 
visible — and make legible — their 
phenomenological pain. 
 
When signifiers fail 
Desjarlais’ arguments regarding the 
dilemmas that anguished people face in 
Enlightenment societies where their anguish 
is often deemed less-than-valid and not-
quite-real are insightful, and his Goffmanian 
observations regarding the pathogenicity of 
institutional environments are often quite 
arresting. However, the utility of his analysis 
is limited in at least two ways. First, he 
begins and concludes his ethnography by 
asserting a questionable distinction between 
the mentally ill and the normal. Persons in 
the former category are, he says, “struggling 
along” rather than truly “experiencing,” and 
are precluded from the full range of 
communicative faculties that the rest of us 
enjoy — hence their need to cut and scar in 
order to give voice to pain (Desjarlais 
1997:10-24; 249). I would contend that the 
practices he observes in the shelter differ 
only in degree and method, rather than in 
genre, from the mentally ‘normal.’ Second, 
he seems to assume that self-injury can be 
motivated only by a desire to establish a line 
of communication. Presenting readers with a 
false dilemma, for instance, he asserts that 
his informants’ self-injurious behaviour 
“was not due to any language-shattering 
inexpressibility inherent in the agony of pain 
or distress. It related, rather to questions of 
acknowledgement and recognition” 
(Desjarlais 1997:234). Given that he 
provides no rationale for ruling out the first 
of the two motives prima facie, one wonders 
why the two cannot coexist. 
In her eloquent essay “Translating 
the Pain Experience,” Jean Jackson (2003) 
takes the topic of ‘language-shattering 
inexpressibility’ more seriously by 
considering the ways in which sufferers of 
severe chronic pain in New England’s 
Commonwealth Pain Center (CPC) 
struggled to verbalize their experience of 
pain. Jackson’s (2003:172) informants found 
it almost impossible to identify adjectives, 
symbols, or similes that adequately evoked 
what they felt. Many complained that 
however exhaustive their descriptions or 
visceral their comparisons (i.e., pain was 
likened to flashes of lightning, twisting 
daggers, searing heat, demonic possession, 
and lit blowtorches), the obscenity of their 
felt pain was such that it defied linguistic 
circumscription, especially given the 
paltriness of the referential lexicon available 
to them. As a result, while patients were 
“highly motivated to translate their pain by 
objectifying it…they realized that because 
such objectification distorted the experience, 
in a sense betrayed it, their translations were 
defective” (Jackson 2003:177), and many 
eventually became resistant to clinicians’ 
solicitations of self-reflection. Moreover, 
their realization that their descriptions were 
being misinterpreted, pigeonholed into 
quantitative metrics, and even viewed as 
hyperbole by their clinicians led CPC 
patients to focus more attention on 
demonstrating that their pain had somatic 
causes and that their anguish was therefore 
legitimate, and less on expressing the pain 
itself.  
While patients reported feeling 
isolated, trivialized, and betrayed by 
referential language, they also “felt 
compelled to commit to pin their hopes on 
it” and “continued to long for a language 
that promised distance, control, and 
abstraction precisely because representation 
is not coterminous with experience” 
(Jackson 2003:175-178, 183). Patients clung 
to language because language allowed them 
to intellectualize their aversive experiences 
in the same register as their clinicians, and 
thus to enlist empathy from those 
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empowered to legitimize their distress. 
However, while empathy is a start — unlike 
sympathy, it requires some mutuality of felt 
emotion — it is not equivalent to embodied 
understanding. In addition to the fact that 
medical clinicians routinely discredit ill 
people’s capacities to speak rationally about 
their own illnesses (due not only to 
stereotyped concerns about the biases of 
firsthand experiencers, but to attributions to 
“secondary” and “tertiary” motives; see 
Sullivan 1995), in the rationalist intellectual 
tradition to which biomedicine is heir, 
observers are not supposed to participate in 
the phenomena they observe lest they lose 
their objectivity. One of the chief reasons 
why pain occupies an especially suspect 
space in the diagnostic lexicon is that it 
cannot be observed without the participation 
of the sufferer. As a result, Jackson 
observes: 
Those who can produce author-
itative translations … not only 
are, by definition, non-
experiencers, but, in addition, 
their job is to eliminate the 
experiential qualities of what-
ever malady lies behind the pain 
symptoms and replace them 
with observed, objective data — 
with signs rather than 
symptoms. Even though pain 
sufferers attempt to learn the 
professional’s language, they 
will never be seen to speak it 
fluently, precisely because they 
experience pain. (Jackson 2003: 
187) 
In short, CPC patients felt that 
language was not only inadequate, it was 
also the handmaiden of a medical 
establishment that already had its own 
answers and solutions to the problem of 
chronic pain, ones that imposed standard-
ized, precooked interpretations upon deeply 
private battles, and that unremittingly strove 
to objectify — dissect, measure, calculate, 
determine causes of, find Latin terms for, 
and reduce into case histories — fluid 
experiences that revolted against objecti-
fication. Patients consequently lived out the 
anguishing paradox of yearning for some 
means by which they might successfully 
disclose the texture of their inexpressibly 
painful world in a way that preserved both 
accuracy and authority, while at the same 
time increasingly withdrawing from (and 
yearning for the freedom to fully abandon) 
the Sisyphean project of producing 
verbalizations fated invariably for mis-
understanding. 
 
Estrangement as engagement 
Jackson’s account of the existential 
frustrations of chronic pain sufferers is 
nuanced and stirring, and her description of 
the relief that sufferers experienced in the 
presence of other sufferers who understood 
how hard it was to find words for pain’s 
“preobjective and prelinguistic quality” 
(Jackson 2003: 183-184) raises compelling 
questions about the anaesthetic qualities of 
rapport. Pain, as Jackson reveals, effects a 
ferocious siege on language; when one has 
exhausted the conventionalized repertoire of 
tropes, similes, and allusions that one can 
summon to give shape to an excruciating 
experience, what remains is silence and 
isolation. Nonetheless, Jackson also slips a 
bit too easily into the assumption that the 
only reason distressed individuals engage in 
seemingly irrational practices is to 
legitimize their distress in the eyes of 
authorities (e.g. “abandoning attempts to 
translate a pain experience may constitute a 
step toward successfully communicating 
what the experience is like”, Jackson 
2003:185). What of the significance of a 
person’s refusal to speak of her pain 
experience — or her decision to harm 
herself, or discern a kindred spirit in Roman 
literature, or engage in whatever else might 
TOTEM vol 19 2010-2011 
 
 
Tsao: Knowing is Half the Battle?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
TOTEM 43 
 
serve, in her own eyes, as an emblem of her 
biographic travails — to herself? In 
particular, how might behaviours that are 
deemed ‘irrational’ in mainstream and 
medical discourses, such as neglecting one’s 
personal hygiene, actually represent 
methods of giving meaning to personal 
hardship? 
It is here that I return to the question 
with which I began this essay. To what 
extent is an individual’s pain knowable by 
others? Contrary to the phenomenological 
position that Desjarlais and Jackson 
articulate, Wittgensteinian anthropologists 
and others within the post-analytic 
philosophical tradition have held that pain 
must be knowable by others in order to be 
knowable to experiencers themselves (Ulin 
2001:46-62). However a person experiences 
a given torment, and whatsoever meanings 
materialize for her, those experiences and 
those meanings derive coherence from a 
cultural-linguistic heritage — myths, 
primordial symbols, narrative conventions, 
folkloric images, and the like — that is 
shared. In his work on “heteroglossic” 
speech genres, Mikhail Bakhtin (1999:121-
124) has similarly argued that all semiotic 
productions carry with them the weight of 
their historical contexts of usage: a word or 
sign comes to mean a certain thing not 
because it has been defined thus a priori, but 
because all of the subjective ways in which 
it has been used in the past have converged 
to produce a specific, intersubjectively 
intelligible, contemporary meaning that is 
reconfirmed and refashioned every time a 
speaker evokes it. 
The point is twofold. First, even 
preobjectified pain is not precultural; the 
ways in which people understand and give 
meaning to their pain are both internally 
produced and contextually derived. Second, 
while the histories of radical medicalization, 
demythologization, and secularization that 
pain symptoms/emblems have undergone in 
our biomedicine-informed society have had 
the effect of masking their heteroglossic 
character, there always exists a symbolic 
grammar from which such symptoms and 
emblems emerge and take shape. What 
should interest the anthropological observer 
is not the somewhat tautological question of 
what performances of pain are meant to 
communicate, but how people learn to 
perform their pain in the way that they do. 
In Medusa’s Hair: An Essay on 
Personal Symbols and Religious Experience, 
Gananath Obeyesekere (1981) advances a 
sophisticated exegesis of precisely this 
question, arguing that the classical 
anthropological distinction between 
‘private’ and ‘public’ symbols fails to 
capture the dynamic ways in which 
signifier-signified relationships work within 
their contexts of use. As cultural 
productions, symbols invariably have 
significance on both individual and 
interpersonal levels: manifestations of pain 
are therefore simultaneously personal 
experiences and public performances. 
Through a close reading of the harrowing 
life narratives of “ecstatic priestesses and 
priests” who were once ordinary members of 
their communities, Obeyesekere (1981:169, 
80-85, 77) explains that the dramatic idioms 
and imageries that enable their special status 
(e.g., pierced tongues, performances of 
trance and demonic possession, and 
especially the cultivation of filthily matted 
coils of hair) are not valorized in southeast 
Sri Lanka, but are, in fact, deeply 
stigmatized and often feared. This stigma, 
however, provides outcasts who are unable 
to achieve belonging within their families or 
communities with a durable identity that 
derives its durability not from inclusionary 
practices but rather exclusionary ones.  
Obeyesekere is especially concerned 
with the meaning of matted hair, which 
elicits both anxiety and awe within the Sri 
Lankan mainstream, caught as it is between 
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the countervailing imperatives of concern 
for hygiene and uneasy respect for the 
religious guilds into which pariahs 
congregate. The phenomenon conjoins three 
questions. How did matted hair become such 
a rich signifier? What does matted hair 
represent to wearers themselves? What does 
it represent to observers, and from what 
cultural logics does this message derive 
coherence? By considering the ways in 
which people’s growth of messy, tangled 
coils of hair is linked with painful and 
humiliating life experiences (e.g., the loss of 
familial love, a futile search for belonging, 
the repeated appearance of a divine figure in 
one’s dreams, the renunciation of conjugal 
love, and “the god’s gift for having 
renounced eros for agape… matted hair,” 
Obeyesekere 1981:33, 88), Obeyesekere 
contends that some hardships can be so 
psychically painful and beyond the capacity 
of the individual to consciously subdue, that 
they demand materialization in the form of 
alienation. Individuals in pain may need 
their community’s repudiation to understand 
their own pain even if, or especially when, 
those communities will not help them out of 
their pain. As a symbol, matted hair is 
strongly associated in Sri Lanka with filth, 
physical duress, a lack of sanitation, and the 
revulsion such things elicit within the 
wearer’s community — and thus, a “special 
and redoubtable” status for the person 
making the transition from frightened 
outcast to frightful icon (Obeyesekere 
1981:35-37, 63).  
Three distinctions are of particular 
significance within Obeyesekere’s thesis. 
The first is between a “living” symbol and a 
“nonliving” one, the former of which 
requires its users to voluntarily “create it 
each time on the anvil of their person 
anguish,” lest it lose its coherence in the 
public eye; the latter of which exists only in 
inert texts (Obeyesekere 1981:33, 37-8). The 
second is between a “symbol” and a 
“symptom,” the former of which operates to 
encode its bearer as a unique being; the 
latter, simply “a somatic manifestation of a 
psychic or physical malady” acquired 
through disease or neglect (Obeyesekere 
1981:37). The third is between a “myth 
model” and a “fantasy,” the former of which 
involves a person’s use of mythic tropes “to 
produce, and thereafter justify, innovative 
acts, meanings, or images that help express 
the personal needs and fantasies of 
individuals”; the latter, an expression of 
desire that does not necessarily make use of 
wider mythologies (Obeyesekere 1981:84, 
123, 136-137). In all cases, the fulcrum of 
the distinction is, in essence, the tension 
between idiom and idiosyncrasy — the first 
has a clear and irreducible meaning within a 
local context of use, while the second does 
not — and, in Sri Lanka, outcasts who bear 
filthy, snarled dreadlocks are not seen as 
dishevelled psychotics but as potential 
clerics. The fact that a person is feared and 
alienated by his community does not 
necessarily mean that he has been severed 
from their universe of meaning. As 
Obeyesekere suggests, stigmatization may 
eschew cultural boundaries, but psych-
iatrization is a peculiarly Western fetish:  
Thus a Sri Lankan patient 
afflicted by a preta [demon] can 
behave in any number of 
seemingly bizarre yet recognized 
ways and, like a Western 
psychotic, act out his or her 
troubled emotions. But such 
behaviour is in fact not 
considered bizarre: it is readily 
understood as the work of a 
preta, not only by the culture but 
also by the patient. The question 
of private and idiosyncratic 
behaviour does not arise: that is a 
Western conception arising from 
the decoding and demyth-
ologizing of symbols. The 
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personal (not private) exper-
iences of the patient are readily 
intelligible through the myth 
model; and the myth model is 
revitalized and rendered real by 
the personal behaviour of the 
patient. (Obeyesekere 1981:101) 
The notion — so heavily advertised in our 
medicalized society — that pain only 
destroys and isolates is belied by the 
extensive narratological work that a wide 
range of people put into making sense of 
anguish, discovering value in their torment, 
and, in so doing, refashioning their social 
identities to accommodate rather than deny 
their suffering and stigma. If in our society 
it has become difficult, even unfathomable, 
for mainstream audiences to sanction or 
salute the refashioned identities of 
individuals who cannot escape their pain and 
so enshrine it, we may wish to ask ourselves 
why that is. 
 
The things we do for love 
On the outskirts of every agony sits some observant 
fellow who points. (Woolf 1931:205) 
 
Pain is no indelible mystery, at least 
not to anyone who has experienced it. As 
Desjarlais, Jackson, and Obeyesekere each 
deftly demonstrate, the concept tethers a 
vast landscape of signs, scripts, and icono-
graphies that each communicate some aspect 
of what it feels like. It can be vulgar and 
heaving; irresistibly violent; or chronic, 
cruel, and whispering. It can be emotionally 
felt and physically manifested, or vice versa. 
On the surface, therefore, the question of 
whether or not pain can be communicated to 
others is at least a little bit disingenuous, 
because the answer is: of course it can. 
But evoking shared imageries and 
patterns of synonymy to give voice to one’s 
suffering is no guarantee of understanding, 
let alone knowability. In circumstances 
wherein social roles are available to help a 
“person afflicted with mental illness, 
tension, or turmoil to cope with his 
estrangement” (Obeyesekere 1981:103-104), 
it is possible for pain to be understood by 
both oneself and one’s observers as a 
coherent, meaningful — even redemptive —
experience. However, for those of us who 
inhabit a society that has secularized demons 
and cashiered them from its behavioural 
landscape, pain is a barren destination and a 
source of relentless misconception. Unable 
to establish common ground with clinicians 
and denied opportunities to carve out roles 
for themselves in the social tapestry, 
Desjarlais’ schizophrenic self-injurers and 
Jackson’s chronic pain sufferers are exiled 
twice over: first by their ineffable pain, and 
again by the probing callipers of the social 
workers, doctors, and administrators who 
confect their expressions of pain into well-
defined, neatly manicured lines of data. 
Melford Spiro (1990), borrowing a 
phrase from T.S. Eliot, once observed that 
the task of anthropology is to make the 
strange familiar and the familiar strange. 
Rather than claiming to be disinterested 
discoverers of objective knowledge, modern 
anthropologists have indeed consistently 
sought to reveal the ways in which 
knowledge — all knowledge, whether 
scholarly, folk, sacred, or secular — is 
actively produced by individuals who are 
situated in and shaped by particular times 
and places. Over the past decade, our 
discipline has seen a florescence of research 
on war, displacement, migration, 
urbanization, and postcolonialism, demon-
strating how crucial it is for us to take 
seriously the firsthand knowledges of people 
who have survived unique blows, and to 
honour the symbolic and spatial tools they 
deploy to manage the warp and woof of their 
traumas. Anthropologists studying the 
politics of marginality have increasingly 
identified key places for pain as a point of 
analytic departure: rage and heartache can 
become determining forces in people’s lives 
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when historical injustices remain un-
corrected (Livingston 2009), and the 
problem is exacerbated when mainstream 
onlookers fail to grasp, honour, or heed “the 
ways that past violence inhabits the present” 
(Langford 2009:705). However, making 
these insights evident and pedagogically 
useful to a wider range of research 
communities will take more work. In our 
society, biomedicine is a dominant force in 
trauma research, and its discourses and 
practices carry considerable weight even 
among anthropologists who labour to reveal 
the history behind prim medical theories 
(Breslau 2004; Lock and Nguyen 2010; 
Tsao 2009). 
In a neoliberalizing climate that 
increasingly views quality of life in terms of 
workplace productivity, economic 
profitability, legal responsibility, and 
pharmaceutical pliability, the frameworks 
that researchers impart upon pain have 
significant practical effects: they trivialize 
and pathologize some people’s expressions 
of self, and they valorize others’. To 
challenge the rise of scientistic models that 
take for granted the notion that suffering is 
largely rooted in chemical imbalances and 
congenital predispositions, many anthro-
pologists have levelled powerful counter-
arguments that correctly and conscientiously 
shed light on the class inequalities and other 
socioeconomic factors that have major 
effects on health (Baer, Singer, and Susser 
2003; Dressler 2010). Indeed, as 
multidisciplinary researchers, anthropo-
logists are especially well-situated to raise 
questions about the latent assumptions that 
inform investigations in multiple areas of 
scholarship, and the steps we’ve taken in 
this regard have been very heartening. At the 
same time, an unintended consequence of 
this trend has been a bit of over-eagerness to 
assign cost-benefit rationales to self-
destructive choices (cf. some researchers’ 
insistence that anorexics starve themselves 
solely to fulfill social expectations or that 
sex workers are inevitably motivated by 
financial desperation; see Gooldin 2008 and 
Leclerc-Madlala 2003 for reviews of these 
positions), a move that elides the subtle 
philosophical inducements that some see in 
their pain, stigmatization, and exile. As 
Wardlow (2006:23) notes, studies that 
axiomatically treat individuals’ actions as 
ancillary to their socioeconomic settings can 
end up erasing their personal agency — their 
capacity and right to prefer to be “wayward” 
when understanding is absent and 
acceptance seems impossible. 
What is the upshot of all of this?  
Within a biomedical culture that is heavily 
informed by economic variables, pain is 
embodied deviance: an irregularity that 
marks a particular body as something other 
than optimally productive/normal, and 
therefore an irresistible site of empirical 
inquiry. Pain that seems to lack a material 
origin is not just deviance; it is delusion. In 
this context, “denying an audience to 
someone who wishes to narrate their pain is 
as much a violation as forcing a pain 
discourse on someone intent on silencing it” 
(Gabriel 2004:180), and the dual violation 
reveals an uncomfortable dilemma. The 
semiotic resources that people mobilize to 
fashion themselves into survivors of 
adversity tap insistently into larger conflict 
narratives — the conquest of Hesperia, Sri 
Lankan demon dramas, or the Book of Job, 
the persecution of Shylock, the siege of 
Troy, the demise of Camelot, and countless 
other fragments of folklore, both ancient and 
modern — that are anchored in sophisticated 
constructions of grief, futility, anguish, 
weariness, regret, outrage, betrayal, tragedy, 
and despair. These constructions, however, 
do not have a place in diagnostic parlance or 
laboratorial practices, which brandish “a 
special technical status based on objectivity 
and standardization independent of society 
and culture” (Lock and Nguyen 2010:53). 
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Pain, ultimately, has become untranslatable 
through unsparing processes of rational-
ization and medicalization that treat folk 
knowledges, in all their messiness and 
mutability, as inauthentic forms of know-
ledge. Yet pain, while rarely chosen, does 
not invariably defile, and there are times 
when searching for empirical causes and 
assigning stable definitions to suffering 
distorts the experiences of those who suffer. 
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